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Abstract 
Title: Market efficiency test of Australian Options Market using put call parity 
analysis. 
Author: Lee Eng Kiang, Peter 
The aims of this thesis is twofold. The primary objective is to test the market 
efficiency of Australian Options Marlcet (AOM) using the put call parity model. In 
addition, empircal evidence on the put call parity model is also gather. 
The put call parity model specified a deterministic relation between the prices of calls 
and puts. In particular, the put call parity model spec.1fies an upper and lower 
boundary conditions. A breach in the put call parity model result in arbitrage 
opportunities which is inconsistent with a efficient market. Four companies !::ihare 
options traded in AOM over a six month period, were used to test whether' the put 
call parity pricing relation was maintained. 
The thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter 1 spell out the aims of the thesis and 
a brief overview of the structure of AOM. This is follow by a literature review on 
previous studies of put call parity analysis. Chapter 3 describe the methodology and 
hypothesis tested in the current study. The findings of the test are reported in 
Chapter 4. The final chapter summarizes the methodology and findings of this thesis. 
The findings of the thesis support the hypothesis that the AOM is efficient over the 
period study. Violations of put call parity boundary conditions were infrequent None 
of these violations yield economic profits for pontential arbitragers. Lower boundary 
violations occur more often than upper boundary violations. In addition, the lower 
boundary violations appear to be affected by companies specific effect, time to 
maturity effect and degree in which options is "in the money". 
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CHAPTER i 
INTRODUCTIO~J, 0\fl?:RVIE\1\1 A~.JD PURPOSE 
Introduction and Definitions 
An option is a contract in which the seller (writer), for a certain sum of money 
(option premium), gives the buyer the right, but not the obligation, to buy or sell a 
spectfied number of financial instruments or other commodities at a fixed price 
(exercise price) within a sp2eified time (temninating at e)(piration date). This light 
(rather then obligation) allows an Investor the ability to obtain unlimited profit while 
limiting the loss to the option premium. There are two different categories of 
option. A call option gives the holder of the option contract the right to buy, while a 
put option gives the holder the right to sell. 
For the period January-December 1991, there were 25 to 29 company stocks over 
which call and put options were traded in the Australian Options Marl<et (AOM). 1 
The stocl< options traded are of the "American" as distmct from the "European" 
type. American options can be exercised anytime until the expiration date while 
European option can only be exercised on the expiration date. 
The primary aim of this thesis is to examine the marl<et efficiency of the AOM 
through the pricing relationship beiween call and put options. More specifically, the 
relationship tested is the put-call parity that was first ~coven by Stoll in 1969.2 A 
breach of "put-call parity'' vJould allow an investor to obtain an arbitrage profit, 
which is inconsistent with an efficient marl<et. Additionally, empirical evidence on 
the parity relation in Australia is collected, as most past studies have concentrated 
only on absolute pricing models such as the Blacl< and Scholes model. 
1 Beside share options, the other types of option currently traded in Australia are bonri 
options, currency options, commodity options and share price index options. {Par!< al.-~i 
Sohoonfcld 1992,p. 119) 
2 Ga!ai <Jnd Brenner (1 986) credited Castelli (1887) for first describing the parity relation in 
the book The Theory of "Options" in Stoclrs and Shnres. 
1 
Structure of !he· A us!ralian Options Market 
Before examining the efficiency of the AOM, it is useful to take a brief overview of 
the structure of the market. The ADM began trading options in February 1976 as 
the first mganised option exchange outside North America. The initial options 
traded were call options on company stocks of BHP, CSR and WMC. It was not 
until September 19B2 that the AOM introduced put options. The AOM structure 
was modelled after the Chicago Board of Options Exchange (CBOE) with a system 
of registered traders. Acx:ording to Peak Marl<wick (1986), registered traders are 
allowed to trade on their own accounts which ensure orcierty and continuous 
trading opporl.unities. Continuity of trade is established through asking registered 
traders to mal<e a market in an option or alternatively trade in at least one contract. 
either buying or selling, to the me;rket they had made. These also ensure that 
appropriate prio~ relationships are maintained in the option series even in a thin 
market. 
The other innovation that ensures orderly and continuous trade is the board 
broi'"r. A board broker is an employee of the Option Clearing House (OCH) and is 
not t)ermitted to tre1de on his own but only on client orders placed with him at a 
price limit. Orders are e)(ecuted on a first come, first serve basis, regardless of 
size. This ensures that all investors have equal access to the mar1<et. 
Furthermore, operators that trade among themselves have to trade at prices within 
the marl<et prices set by registered traders, and board brol<ers have first priority. 
The marl<et prices set by registered traders are the daily quoted bid/asl< spread. 
These are the prices where registered traders stand ready to buy an option 
cqntroct at the bid quote or s~ll an option contract ut the as!< quote. By ensuring 
board brol<ers' client orders are e)(ecuted first before trading be~Neen operators 
are al!owed, also help ensures competitive prices are maintained. 
2 
Purpose of Study 
The aim of the study is twofold. The first Is to test the efficiency of the AOM; the 
second to provide empirical evidence on the put call parity relation. The test of 
market efficiency conforms to Fa rna's (1 970) dasstfication of the weak form 
market efficiency hypothesis since the lest is on the pricing relation and not on the 
profitability of traded based on publicly or privately available information. 
Test of the efiiciencv of the? Austmiion Options PJl~rket 
There are important implications of a marl\et being found to be efficient. 
The most notable is, of course, that past prices fully reflect all relevant 
information in an efficient marlmt and it thus serves as an efficient allocator 
of scarce resources. As noted by Stoll and Whaley (1992, p. 12) "Option 
markets encourage increased research and analysis ... Insofar as increased 
analysis and increased interest improves the quality of prices. resources 
will be allocated more effrcientiy." In general, Cox and Rubinstein (1985) 
also argued that an efficient options marl<et provides useful source of 
information for important economic decisions. This is because options 
prices contain implicit predictions about future events such as, future 
volatility, cash dividendo and interest rates. Additionally, options marl<et 
provides a mean toward an economy with "complete mart<et". A complete 
marl<et is wlv~re any securities returns Vjn be duplicated by existing 
securities. A complete marl<et, by providing a wide variety of securities 
returns, further enhances the eff!ciency in resource allocation. 
Furthermore, Ell most t~il tests of pricing models use efficient markets as a 
starting point. This is due to the fact that tests of a pricing model are joint 
tests of marl<el efiiciency and the pricing model. The put-call parity does 
3 
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not fall !nto the trap of joint hypothesis tests as it only specifies a distinct 
price relationship between the prices of call option, put options and the 
underlying steele. Gray ( 1989, p.152) thus argued that, "[in] examining put-
call parity, It may be possible to directly test the efrlclency of an options 
marl<et, since the relative pricing of put and call options is being examined, 
rather than the absolute price of an option." Similar arguments can also be 
found in articles by Loudon (1988, p. 54) and Taylor (1990, p. 205). 
Assuming data accuracy and marlcet synchronisation, a ex-ante violation of 
this relationship would allow Investors arbitrage opportunities and is 
therefore prima facie evidence of an inefficient market and not the result of 
pricing model mlsspeclflcatlon. The assumption of an efficient market 
allows rewarchers to conclude that any deviation between. the observed 
price and the model price Is due solely to the pricing model, or vice versa. 
Thus, the findings of a test of the efficiency of an options marl<et test also 
have Important implications for past and future tests of option pricing 
modflls. Though it is not suggested here that the study will give an 
Irrevocable statement of whether the option marl(et is efficient or not. No 
such test is possible. Rather, the study hope to provide additional evidence 
for the support or rejection on the assumption of mancet efficiency. 
Test of oul-<:all parity 
The second purpose of the study Is to emphically test whether 111e 
Australian data support the put-call parity relation. Almost all finance texts 
whiclh have a chapter on options will contain a section on the put-call parity 
model. The other prominent feature o\' option theory Is of course the Blacl< 
and Scholes option pricing model. Whit3 abundant research has been done 
on the validity of the Blaclc and Scholes option prtclng model, the research 
4 
on put-call parity has been limited. As noted by Kochman and Hood (1986), 
tests of option mart<et efficiency have concentrated on the correspondence 
between mart<et and model prices. 3 
The Australian research on put-call parity is generally limited to three 
articles and one unpublished worl<lng paper. Tl1e three articles are those of 
Gray (1989), Loudon (1988) and Taylor (1990). The working paper by 
Brown and Easton (1992) does not really provide new empirical evidence 
on the parity relation In the AOM. Rather it found that the evidence 
collected from the Loudon and Taylor articles was In direct conftlct and 
attempted to reconcile the resutts of the two articles. They found that due to 
certain methodology and calculation mlstal<es In Taylors article, there Is 
strong reason to disregard Taylor's results. Thus, In effect there are 
currently only two research studies that provide empirical evidence on the 
parity relation. 
In addition, the period covered by the above three articles encompassed 
the years prior to 1987. As noted in Taylors article (1990, footnote 6 ), In 
the period examined in his study institutional restrictions on the short 
selling of stocf< were In force. The Australian Steel< Exchange amended the 
rules to allow for short selling from September 1986. As short selling of 
steel< Is one of the essential features In the enforcement of the "upper 
boundary" of the parity relation, it would be interesting to see how the 
change In Institutional structure has affected the applicability of this parity 
relation. 
3 Tho study of Etaclt :::!nd Scholes option pricing model in Australi<m context includes Brown 
(1978), Castagna and Matotcsy (1982, 1983) and Chioretla and Hughes (1978a, 1978b). 
Th~ cmpiric:JJ lcs!s of B!acl< .omd Scholes option pricing model in America are fOIJ numerous 
to be fisted though G<Jia'1's (1 983) article A survey of empirical tests of option pricing models 
dozs provida a good review of past studies. 
5 
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The other new development in the AOM nol covered in previous studies of 
put-call parity analysis was the Introduction of "spot options". Spot options, 
as distinct from the regular options, expire within the month rather than 
following the quarte(ly expiration cycle of the regular options. This has the 
effect of increasing the number of option series available to investors as 
they are now not restricted to just the quarterly expiry option series. As a 
result, the pricing data for this study also increased from just the regular 
quarterly expiry option series to new option sertes. 
Flnany, the various effects on put call parity relation are also Investigated. 
The various effects that will be examined include: 
I) effect of using different discounting methods and risi< free estimates; 
ii) effect of different firms and sectors; 
Iii) effect of time to maturity and 
iv) effect of the options being "in the money''. 
The purpose of the thesis is thus to test the efficiency of the AOM and, in addition, 
to provide additional empirical evidence on the validity of the put-call parity 
theorem in Australia. 
6 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERA TUR.~ RE§:VIE\111 
The literature survey begins with finding an appropriate definition for the term 
"market f.~fficiency". Though most finance academics are familiar with Fama's 
classifiGation of the efficient market hypothesis (EMH), thE-re is now a school of 
thought thai contends that Fama's classification is inadequate or inappropriate. In 
a recent NATO research workshop on financial market efficiency, Guimaraes, 
Kingsman and Taylor (1988) documented the unsuccessful attempt to get a clear 
consensus on a common definition of efficiency. As noted by Guimaraes eta!., 
"Some participants [of the wort<shop] argued for particular definitions whilst others 
regarded efficiency as a matter of degree or as a state that prevailed at some 
times but not at othero."(p. 3) Nonetheless, Guimaraes et al. point cut that without 
a precise definition of market efficiency, it is difficult to formulate research designs 
for testing the efficiency hypothesis and also draw acceptable conclusions from the 
research. Thus, the first tas!< is to choose an appropriate definition. The theoretical 
proof and development of the parity relation are then reviewed in the following 
section. Previous empirical studies on the parity relation and option mCJrket 
efficiency tests are reviewed in the last section. 
Definition of efficiency 
The study oi financial mart<et efficiency has a long and illustrious history. The first 
use of the term "efficient marl<et" was credited by Ball (1988) to Fama, Fisher, 
Jensen and Rollin their 1969 article. Since then the definition of efficient mart<et 
has gone through a series of refinements and developments. Though there are no 
7 
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clear consensus on a precise definition for marltet efficiency, Guimaraes et al. do 
point to information efficiency as a comrnun essential starting polnt.4 
There are generally two alternative definitions of !~formation efficiency. These are 
broadly split into the 'Chicago school' or 'empirical' view and the 'Bert<eley school' 
or 'Information economics' view. Chicago school definition of etoclency treats the 
market as an entity in its awn right and ignores individual investors' behaviour. 
That Is, the mart<et Is personified and s\udled as an entity alone. How Individual 
investors' behaviours combine to influence mar!tet efficiency is left in a "blacl< 
box". Ber~eley school In contrast begins by lool<ing at Individual Investors and how 
their aggregate behaviour::; influence the efficiency of the marlcet. Thus, it can be 
said that the former begins with a macro level while the latter works Its way up 
from the micro level. s 
Ball argued against the Berkeley school in that the more formalised definition of 
looking at Individual investors does not provide any further useful insight compare 
to the Chicago school of lool<ing at the marl<et as an entity. Also from a theoretical 
viewpoint, it suffered from confusion bet\rveen properties of information and 
properties of mart<ets. The Ber1<eley school is actually comparing a marl<et which 
t1as costless information to the actual market (properties of information) and not 
testing the degree to which the actual market differs from an ideal marl<et. 
(properties of mart<et) There Is another argument against using the Bert<eley 
school of definition in this study. The set of individual investors for steele market 
efficiency Is much more easily Identified than the set of Individual Investors 
required to test option market efficiency. Thi> is due to the fact that the values of 
t Tile varivus form!.> of er-flciency are, exchange efficiency, production efficiency and 
infonnatior· efficiGncy. El,change efficiency tests the.:: efficiency of converting production to 
consumption (prop:::rty of consumption marlmts) while production efficiency tests how 
efficient is the production organised (property of production) and information efficiency tests 
how quicltly price!.> reflect oll relevant inforrn.:~tion (property of infonnntion and securities 
~rices). 
For a more in depth discussion on the tVm school:: of thought see Guimaraes et al. ( p. 3-
5) and Ball {1 989, p. 32-35) 
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options are derived from stock prices. A stock market efficiency test • n 
concentrate on the set of investors in that single marltet but optic ,oar'<et 
·efficiency has to talte into account investors in both the stoclt a no the option 
marltets. If the option marltet Is found to be Inefficient, suci1 Inefficiency could be 
driven either by individuals investing only in the option mar!(et, or by steele market 
Investors, or by Investors who Invest In both stoclt and option marltets. The taslts 
of separating and analysing this set of investors behaviour are difficult. The parity 
model further compounds the problem when one considers that It Involves three 
securities. (The call option, the put option and the underlying stoclt.) Thus, 
Individual Investors' behaviour Is not analysed rather, the efficiency of the option 
mari<et as an entity is tested. 
Even ~the Chicago school's definition is accepted, further refinement is required. 
As noted by Guimaraes et al. (1988), the definitions of efficiency by both Chicago 
and Berkeley schools are statement of economic theory which do not direct~ 
address the question of a precise testable measure of marlret efficiency. That Is, 
both Chicago and Berlreley schools only define the term efficiency but do not 
specified a measure of eiflciency that is testable. The testable definition of 
efficiency used in this study is that of Jensen (1978, p.96): 
"A market is efficient wilfl respect to information set $t if it is 
impossible to malre economic profits by trading on the basis of 
information set $1 By economic proflts, we mean the risk adjusted 
returns 'net of all costs'." 
Ball (1989, p. 38-39) heavily criticises this definition from the sufficiency view point. 
He noted that a market that does not fully refiect information "''II be deemed 
efficient, using Jensen's definition, ir no trading rules can be devised to eltploit this. 
In addition, he pointed out that there are different tm.nsaclion costs for dif-ferent 
groups of Investors. For e;mmp!a, bro:c.ers or sp8cla11sts fnce muc11 lower 
9 
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transaction costs than normal public Investors. The problem is to identify which set 
of IIV.'estors' transaction costs should be used. 
The defence of Jensen's efficiency definition Is put forward by Guimaraes, et a!. 
(1988). They argued that trading profits net of properly defined transaction costs 
should be regarded as a necessary condition for marf<ets to be deemed efficient. It 
Is necessary that an efficient mar!~et does not allow economic profits bui not 
sufficient to say that since no economic profits are ma•Je In the marl<et then the 
marl<el is efficient. Thus the non e><istence of economic profits only provides partial 
evidence for the test of marl<et efficiency. 
As the parity relation Is based upon an arbitrage argument, transaction costs are 
highly relevant and thus should be explicitly considered in testing marl<et 
efficiency. Though It should be noted that transaction costs will only explain why 
arbitrage opportunities is not e)cploited but not why ~rbitrage ppportunities exist. 
The hlghes·t degree of efficiency would result when the set of Investors which had 
the lowest transaction costs are unable to exploit any economic profit and since 
there are trading rules that can be devised to exploit opportunities for economic 
profits, Jensen definition is appropriate in this study. The trading strategies for 
exploiting breach In parity relation are conversions, reversalo and bol<. 
Standard Put-coli Parity 
The standard put-call parity model was first proven by Stoll (1969). The 
assumptions of the model as identtned by Brown and Easton (1991, p. 2) are: 
(i) 1hc pu~ or.d call options relate to 1hc some underlying shore and the 
options have common m:ercise pric8s and e):piration dates. 
10 
(ii) Trading is "frictionless", which means that no transaction costs or 
taxes arise, and simultaneous trading of the three securities and a risf< 
free asset is possible. 
(iii) The options are of th.o F"ropean type and the stocks pay no 
dividends during the life of the options. 
The pari~' model can be proven WhGn one considers the possible end of period 
cash fiows of a call option and a portfolio consisting of the underlying steel<, the put 
and borrowing at the risk free interest rate r. 6 The two portfolios and cash flows for 
a single period are constructed In Table 1. As both strategies yield the same cash 
ftow under similar marl<et states, the initial investment must be the same. If either 
oi the portfolios is under- or overpriced relative to the other, an investor can sell 
the relatively overpriced portfolio and buy the underpriced to loci< in a rlsl< free 
profit. Therefore In a perfect mart<et the following relation must exist: 
c = s0 + P- K/(1 + r)r ........... (1) 
c = s0 + P- Ke-rr ................. (2) 
where C - call price; 
S - stocl< price; 
P - put prioa; 
K- exercise price (must be the same for both put and call) 
r - risk free interest rate 
e- exponential function; 
T - time to maturity. 
Equation ( 1) uses a discrete discounting factor while equation (2) Is the oontinuous 
disoountlng oounterpart. Tile two difler slightly in the assumption. The fomner 
assumes that assets are traded in discrete time periods while the latter assumes 
G stall's (1 £39) orlgin::JI proof used vector notntion to shovJ thot the investor that writes call 
(put), go:::s lono (short) in th:J undcrl~'ing stoc!> end buys thG equivalent put (c::11!) ie in fact 
not ho!dino ~my position in either tilJ stodt or option marl;.et. Most stcmdmd finance texts 
gcnar<:Jlly us:Js the pori.Colio c:-Jsll ·IJow p<:JyoH to illustrate the parity relation. Tl1e latter 
mcU>od \"lOG chosen ns it is c~•siGr to cornprchcr,d. 
11 
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assumes that assets are traded in discrete time periods while the latter assumes 
continuous trading. Since put call parity require simultaneous trading of the three 
assets, a contim1ous discounting factor would be more appropriate. This is 
because simultaneous trades of the three assets are more probable v:hen trading 
is continuous than in ct;screte interval. Given that in a discrete trading world, the 
three assets trading Interval must coincide before simultaneous trade is possible 
while continuous trading do not have to worry about the trading interval.? 
Nonetheless, the study will employ both discrete and continuous discounting 
factors in testing the marl<et's efficiency.o 
Table 1 
Proof of s1andard plrt-call pariW_JEuropean non...<fividend paying stock options} 
T enninal Value (T) 
Initial Value ifSr<K 
Pollfolio A 
Buy Call -C 0 
Portfolio B 
Buy Stock -Sn ST ST 
Buy Put -P 0 K-ST 
Borrow at interest rate r +l<,e-rT -K -K 
Total -So-P+I<e-rT ST-K 0 
(Adapted from Levy and Samat 1984, p. 579) 
7 For further dh>cussion on the difi'erence between discrete and continuous analysis model 
see Haley and Schall (1979, pp. 239-242) 
B For tho s<::llo of brevity only, continuous timo ona\ysis model is used for subscq~ent 
dizcl:ssion. 
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Put-call pori!y lor Americnn op~ions and dividend paying siocl<s 
The problem with the above model is thet it is only applicable to European options 
(where early el<ercise is precluded) and the stoci<s do not pay dividends 
(assumption 3). The options traded in the AOM are of the American type and the 
stocks do pay dividends. Thus, to use the put-call parity model in the Australian 
context, assumption 3 has to be relmmd or modified. 
Further developments of the parity model had to be credited to Merton (1973) and 
to l<leml<osl<y and Resnicl< (1979). Merton e>ctended the model to incorporate the 
early exercise feature of American type options. Early e"ercise of call options is 
not a problem as it is not rational for investor to e::ercise early. (As long as the 
stocl< Is not paying a dividend or the options are "dividend payout protected", it 
would never be more profitable to e><ercise the call options than to trade it in the 
marl\et.) In the case of put options, however, e)(ercise befoi=e maturity can be 
rational. Given the possibility of puts being el<ercised, the standard parity model 
becomes a boundaoJ condition. IGemkosl<y and Resnicl< then e>ctended the parity 
model to include the effects of dividend payout. If it can be assumed that the 
dividend amount is !mown vtith certainty, the extended parity model will include the 
present value of the certain dividend. 9 The extended put-call boundaries condition 
with its proof Is reproduced below: 
C- S + K + D/(1+r)T;, P;, C- S + l</(1+r)T·················(3) 
C- S + K + De-rT ;, P<: C- S + Ke-rT ....................... (4) 
where D Is the present value of the single certain dividend payout within the 
duration of the option and the other tenms are as previously defined. 
O If the dividend o01mount is unlmown, then the new tem1 will be tJ1e present value of the 
expected maximum divid~nd p<:~yout. 
13 
Upper Boundary Proof10 
The upper boundal)' restriction of a put value is give by C- S + K + oe-rr~ P. 
Rearranging the equation yields C - S + K + De-rr - P ~ 0. The upper boundal)' 
condition can be proven by considering a portfolio constructed by writing the put, 
buying tile call, short selling the steel<, buying D amount In the form of a risl< free 
bond and placing amount l< in a savings account. 11 This is illustrated in Table 2. 
When the stool< pays the dividend, liquidate D to compensate dividends paid as 
the stock was short. If the short position is closed off before e'~piration or if less 
than mal<imum dividends are actually paid, the investor with the above portfolio 
would have an added bonus sum from the D risl< free bond source. (See Ex Div 
Day column.) 
If all of the security positions stay open until expiration, (ie no early exercise) the 
-
cash flow at maturity will be a positive amount regardless of the terminal stock 
price. (See the Terminal Value columns.) In this case, however, there is the further 
possibility of early exercise of the put option hy the holder. This is covered by 
withdrawing the amount I( from the savings account to pay for the steel< when the 
put is exercised early. The steel< received can then be used to close out the short 
sale. The investor still has the call option valued Ct and accumulated interest on K. 
(This is illustrated in the Intermediate Value column.) Thus, regardless of whether 
the dividend Is paid or whether there is early exercise of the put option, the net 
terminal value of the portfolio will always be positive and the initial value must also 
then be positive. 
10 The upper Jnd lower boundmy proof DrG adapted irom Cox and Rubinstein {1985, p. 152-
154). 
11 If dividend is unl;nown, the required 1isl\ free bond amount will be o+, which is the 
max1mum expected dividend payout. 
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Upper bound!'lrv proof o1 put.call naritv for American stock options {C-S·H(+Oc-rT -P~O) 
ExDiv Put Exercised Put Exercised at 
~ Early It) maturitr(T) 
Posftion Initial Va/ue12 Intermediate Terminal Value 
Value s ~K s >K 
Sell America Put p -(K- 51) -(K- Sr) -(K- Sr) 
Buy Amerie;a Call -C c, 0 Sr-K 
Short Sale Stock s -D -at -Sr -Sr 
Saving Account K -K Kert KerT KerT 
Risk free Bond D -oe-rT D 
rJet P/folio Value P-C+S-1<-De·rT 0 
(Adapted from Stoll and Whaley (1992,p. 318) 
Lower Boundary Proof 
The lower boundary is given by P >C - S + Ke·rT. or P- C + S - Ke-rr <: 0. (See 
Table 3.) The designated portfolio would consist of buying the put, writing the call, 
buying the steel< and borrowing amount l(e·rT by selling zero-coupon bonds with 
timeT until maturity.13 Again this portfolio should yield positive amounts at the end 
of the day. If there is no early exercise of the call option, the portfolio is the 
12 Note the signs of the initial value are inverse because the net portfolio value represent 
the costs of investing. 
13 Stoll and Whaley's (1 992) proof of the lower boundary inc!ude a redundant borrowing of 
the amount of expected dividend payout. If dividend is received (which will occur if cal! is not 
exerciccd or exGrcissd nfter ex-ciiv doy), then tho portfolio holder v1ill receive a added bonus 
for tl1c amount of the dividend pluG the termin<.!l valuG. On the other homd, if dividend is r:ot 
rccdvcd (c811 c;:ercised prior to ex div day), then t!1e portfolio holder will stilt receive the 
terminal value but without the bonus dividend amount. Thus, the terminal value will still be 
positive reoardless of whe:hGr the dividend is received. 
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combination of the standard put-call parity portfolio of A and B discussed 
previously. Since the investor is now selling the call option portfolio and buying the 
opposite position he would expect zero gain or loss in term of capital value. 
Nonetheless, as he is now dealing with a dividend paying stocl<, the Investor will 
receive the dividend (since the stoclc is now bought long) and will gain from the 
dividend• received and Interest accumulated if the dividend Is put In a savings 
account provided that the call is not exercised early. If the call is exercised before 
expiration date, then he will deliver the stocl< and get the e)(erclse price 1<. The I( 
amount will be used to redeem the bonds and, since interest rates are always 
positive, there will always be enough to do this and there may be a positive 
amount left over. In addition, the investor still has a put option contract and 
possible dividend receipt If earty eJ<erclse occurs after the e)(-divldend date. Thus, 
the net end-of period payoff is again positive regardless both of the amount of the 
dividend or of whether early eJ<erclse of the call option occurs. 
Table 3 
lower boundary proof of Put-call parity for American stoclt options{P..C+S-Ke--rT~Q) 
ExOiv Put Exercised Put Exercised at maturity(T) 
Day Early (t) 
PO$ffion lnffia/ Value Intermediate Terminal Value 
Value s <K s >K 
Sell America Call c -(S,-K) 0 -(5,.-K) 
Buy Sto;:;l< -S D s, ST ST 
Buy America Put -P Pt K-ST 0 
Borrow l<e·rT Ke·rT -Ke·r(T-t) -K -K 
~JC'i: P/iolio V~luc C-S-P+I<e-rT D 
(Adapted from Stoll and VI/haley (1992,p. 319) 
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Previous studies o( put-call paril-y using Amoriea data 
The literature reviev; of past studies of put-call parity will concentrate on use of the 
model to test option marltet eHiciency. Other research papers have used the 
model for purposes other than test of market efiiciency. This is incompatible with 
the purpose of the current study as they all begin with assum, lion of market 
efficiency and therefore will not be reviewed here.t 4 
Stoll (1 969} 
Following the lioeoretical proof of the parity model, Stoll (1969) then went on 
to empirically test the parity model using Over-the-Counter (OTC) options 
martcet data.t5 The data source used were the wee!dy price submissions by 
the Put and Call Dealers Association to the Securities Exchange 
Commission. These included option series on 15 Regular companies and 
10 New Business companies option series with maturity of 90 and 190 
days. The period covered was two years from 1966-67 (or 104 weelrs of 
pu! cmd call prices) for Regular companies option series and one year 1967 
(or 52 weelrs) for the New Business companies option series. Given that 
the price submissions are only nominated prices and not marl(et 
determined prices, only :Jctlve\y traded option series were included as 
these prices are more reliable. The parity models tested were of the limited 
case where the stoclr price equals exercise price and the options are priced 
14 Examples of the other uses of the parity model are the examination of implied interest 
rate in Brcnn2r ond Galai (1986} and Frankfurter and Leung (1991) and an examintltion of 
early e:(ercisc in option prices by Zivney (1991). 
15 The first listed option marl\et, Chicago Board of Exchange was not established until 
1973. 
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relative to the stoclc price. Regression analysis of the following form was 
tested": 
0.25 for the 90 dey msturity and 
The mode! Is supported when a0 =0, a2 =1 and a1 = 
0.50 for the 190 day maturity 
The general results were that there was a signfficant positive relat'1on 
between the relative call and put prices and coefficient a, was 
approximately 1 as predicted by the model. But the constant coefficient a0 
was significantly non-zero and the Interest coefficient a1\vas also different 
from the predicted value of 0.25 or 0.5. The signtficant deviation from zero 
of the constant term (a0 ), was hypothesised to be due to a0 plclc!ng up 
interest cost not reflected in the coefficient of treasury bill rate(a1). The 
deviation of a1 from predicted value was e>cplalned away by Imperfections In 
the data and the effects of interest rate being inconsequential compared to 
transaction costs Stoll ooncluded thus that "by and large the theory Is 
supported by time series and crosf'rsection regression analysis" (p. 823) 
Gould and Gala! ('1974) 
Gould and Gala! (1974) also tested the model using OTC option marnet 
data. They noted that Stoll's inference that the standard parity formula 
applied equally both to American and European options wos false. They 
therefore tested the parity model in terms o1 a boundary condition 
16 The p•~rity model tested is c= p + i, \'lhich is a special CdSC >:/n,zn stocl\ price equals 
exercise price. The genera! model was C= S + P- E1(1+i}. Substituting S=E and dividing 
both side by S yic!ds, CIS= 1+P/S -1/(1+i). Using small c to denote the relative price, the 
model thus predicts c=1+ p- i/(1+i). Than by noting that1 -1/(1+i) = i/(1+i) =: i, UoG model 
!hue predicts that c = p + i v1herc i is the risl\ frco mtc stated on an onnuot basis. The 
r;tredictod co~filcient cf a1 = 0.25 for a 90 day maturity is b(.';cause to convert the annual rate 
to u 90 dny rate, tho rate is adjusted by dividing 90/360. Similarly for 190 day, a1 = .5 or 
1901360. ' 
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(C-P)/Scil(1+i) instead of an equilibrium model. Furthermore, they argued 
that regression technique is inappropriate for testing the el<istence of 
arbitrage profits since regression is based on averaging while tests of 
mart<et efficiency are concerned with outliers. They tested the model by 
using price observations to calculate the formula (C-P)IS- i/(1+i). The 
model is then supported if this yields a negative amount. Their major data 
source used was again the weeldy price submissions of Put and Call 
Dealers for period 1967-69 but In addition to these nominal prices they also 
used actual option prices obtained from the diaries of an option broker for 
the period 1966-69. Their findings showed a surprisingly lc<roe number of 
positive results that represented potential profit opportunities dependent on 
the transaction costs. Many of these abnormal profits were only exploitable 
by members of the New York Stock Elrchange. Nonetheless, the fact that 
members of NYSE h2.d apparent exploitable abnormal profits was found to 
be inconsistent Vlith the model. They therefore concluded that "the model is 
not supporte,j unless rather large transactions costs are Included ... [which] 
raise troublesome questions as to whether there were unexp/oited profit 
opportunllies in the options marl<ets at least during the 1J67-1969 period." 
(p.1 05) 
Klem\roskv and Rosnic\t (1979 and 1980) 
A test of the put-call pariiy model using organised options marl<et1B data 
was perfonmed by 1\\aml<os\ry and Resole!< (1979, 1980). It should be noted 
that the parity model used by Stoll did not consider the effect of dividend 
payout. \Geml<oslry and Resnlcl< ("1979, p. 1149 In footnote 14), argued that 
10 OrgonisGd, li~tcd or ragistcrcd options mmlmt me morl\cts \';hero options arc tr<Jd:z:d in a 
c~ntralis::d Dnd !;L:::ndmdiscd monn,:;r os in th:;1 CBOE .:nd AOM. This is distinct from the 
OTC marl;ct wh8rc options me tmd2d in <J non st::mdordiscd mnnncr ;;md only omong two 
portics witllout tiLe intcrrn~diation of tl1c central clearing corpor.Jtion. For 2 discussion on the 
d1fforcnc.:; b:::l\•:ccn the 1\•Jo m:~rl~cts. see Gasi.ineau (1988, p 2~·23) 
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the OTC models should hove included a dividend term since OTC options 
are only partially dividend payout protected. The effect of a dividend Is 
more dramatic in organised options mar!\ets as listed options are not 
dividend payout protected at all. l(lemi(Qslcy and Resnlc!c thus extend the 
parity model !o incorporate the dividend payout. Their data consisted of 
CBOE, the American and the Philadelphia Stock Exchange put and call 
options on fifteen companies traded over the period July 1977 to June 
1978. They formed two slmuHaneous hedged portfolio;." The long hedged 
portfolio consist of selling a call and buying a synthetic call position and the 
short hedged portfolio involved selling a put and buying a synthetic put 
position." The effect of the long and short hedges are that the investor 
does not have an open position In the option marl<et and should therefore 
not earn any economic profit at all. Of the 606 hedges, they found 234 
profitable hedges. When they allowed for transaction costs, arbitrage 
profits were found to exist only for member firms. Thetthus c.oncluded that 
"the empirical results of the models tested are consistent wlt:l put-call parity 
t~Jeory and thus support this aspect of efficiency of registered options 
ma~<ets." (p. 1154) 
It should be noted though that the 1979 paper was an "ex-post" test where 
they assumed that an arbitrage opportunity could b'' •executed Immediately 
while In the 1980 test they lagged the arbitrage tre,dlng by 5 and 15 minutes 
to form an e::-ante test. In the eJC-anie test l<lemlcoslcy and Resniclc(1980) 
found thnt the '1endenGy fore>< ante profitability to be less tl1an e" post 
profitability and for price ccrrectionr. io to lee place rapidly enough to 
eliminate most if not all of the opportunity for economic profits. " (p. 377) 
16 Tho: hedge \"InS fanned by including only observation th~t have put, call and underlying 
securities !i.::dcd within on8 minute of cr:ch other. 
1° The svnt!1ctic coli <md put position ore replicated by tal~;ing t11e opposite position in the 
pmity formul8. EJ:ample in 111e European non--dividend paying panty, to replicate the call 
position is by construct1no portfolio A. 
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Phillips and Smith (19801 
Before leaving the American arena, an article by Phillips and Smith (1980) 
highlights the importance of Incorporating all transaction costs In tests of 
option marl<et efficiency. They argued that most studies only considered 
explicit transaction r.osts (such as, commissions, costs of floor trading and 
clearing fees).but ignored implicit transaction costs. The implicit transaction 
cost they e:cplored was the bid a sic spread. By Including the Implicit cost of 
this spread, they found that most of the arbitrage opportunities in past 
studies were eliminated. Even tf the arbitrage opportunities still e)(iat after 
netting off bid aslc spread, they argued that the cost of obtaining an 
exchange seat may serve to be the reason for the observed abnormal 
profit. 
Previous studies of put-call parity using Australia data 
Previous studies of put-call parity relation in Australia include Loudon (1988), Gray 
(1989), Taylor (1990) and Brown and Easton(1991,1992). 
Loudon (1980) 
Loudon conducted the first marlcet efficiency test of AOM using the put-call 
parity model. His data source consisted only of BHP options trading data In 
the Kegister o1 Sales for the psriod 1985. The Rlsl~ free rate \'Jas estimated 
from 13 and 26 weelt Treasury notes. He found 38.5% of the sample 
violated the lower boundary condition whila only 1.5% of the sample 
violated ti1o uppor boundary condition. He found tills result surprising as, a 
priori, tho thsomHcel upp8r bound \'Jas more mmly to bG breached than the 
lower. This Is because 1118 upper boundary requires a s!1ort sale of stoclc 
which was not permitted at the time, and also the lower boundary does not 
contain the uncertain dividend term and should therefore be stricter. He 
also tested the sensitivity of the violation rate to interest rate by 
proportional and constant Increase of the T-note rate and found that the 
observed violation result Is unchanged by these adjustments. To e)camine 
the effect of friction In the marltet, he e><amlne the effect of prtce non-
simultaneity, stocl' prtce range (transactions ccst), time to maturity and 
In/out of the money options on violation frequency. He argued that these 
effects may be proxy for friction eJdsting in the mart::ets which cause the 
violations. None of these effect has much e><planatory power In accounting 
for the observed arbitrage opportunities. The largest coefficient of 
determination found was from the effect of steel< price range (adjusted 
R'=28.8%), which highlight the importance of transaction ccsts.20 His 
general ccncluslon was that "obsen~ed violations of the put-call parity 
theorem were not sufficiently large to suggest that there e>dsted potential 
for investors facing normal transactions costs to generate economic 
profits." (p. 65) 
Gray C19B9J 
The purpose of the study by Gray was not to test the AOM marttet 
eiftclency but test the effect of earty e><erclse, dividends payout and 
capitalisation changes in the boundary conditions. Nonetheless, as the 
met110dology used \"Jas to create a hedged portfolio to disccver potential 
abnormai profit, it provides evidence on AOM martwt efficiency.21 No 
specific stocl; option sertes was ldentmed but rather stoclt and option prlr.es 
20 Since bro!\cr:::Jgo £:Jnd st:::1mp duties ao positively rciDtcd to shflrc valu:J and 2rc a 
signific:n1 portion of th:::: trcnc::::ction co;:;ts, tll:J effect of tr.snscction cos!s .src olso 
detcrmin:d by aHcc! of shsro pric~s. 
2f Tho hodges <:rc constructed cmd defined in a similar method by !\lcmlmsl')' and Resnick 
(1979). 
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were selected on the basis that they are traded within the same day with 
last sales price between the closing bid/ask spread and that all the 
securities are listed on the Sydney Stock Exchange. The period covered 
was from June 84 to May 86. For each of these option series, both long 
and short hedge portfolios were formed using similar methodology to 
Klemkoslcy and Resnick (1979) . Marf<et efficiency Is supported when an 
insignificant number of long or short hedge earned abnormal profits. Out of 
a total number of 633 long and short hedges formed, only 67 (69) short 
(long) hedges were ex-ante profitable after cost and 67 (90) short (long) 
hedges were ex-post profitable after cost: a resuH which supports market 
efficiency. 
Taylor(1990)and Brown and Easton (1991, 1992) 
The other direct test of marl<et efficiency using the parity model was by 
Taylor. Taylo~s data consisted of BHP options and Woodside options 
traded over the pariod Oct 82 to Oct85. He found "a significant portion of 
put-call parity violations among AOM data for BHP and Woodside from 
1982 to 1985 inclusive." (p. 215) but concluded that market inefficiency is 
not significant. This is due to the fact that transaction costs eliminate most 
violations and that the violations are concentrated in short-lived, over-
p~ced put options. To take advantage of over-priced put options require a 
construction of a portfolio that Involves Illegal activity (short selling) and 
high contracting costs within the short time frame. Finally, it should be 
noted that Taylor reports that all of the violations occurred In the upper 
boundary, a result that directly conflicts with the findings of Loudon. 
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In an attempt to reconcile the two resu~s. Brown and Easton (1991, 1992) 
duplicated the study using daily quote sheets data. They tested the BHP 
option series traded during the January 85 to September 85 period, a 
period of study common to both researchers. Their findings support Loudon 
as most of the violations occurred In the lower boundary. Further 
examinations of Taylo~s study shows that he made a few critical errors In 
his methodologies. These include the failure to correctly discount the 
exercise price, the Inclusion of zero put price , the failure to ensure that 
data falls within bid as!< spread, and the failure to ensure that securities are 
traded within the day. They therefore concluded .that Taylo~s finding 
involving BHP option series should be disregarded. The other conclusion 
drawn from the analysis was that on a pn·on grounds, the dala source in 
Loudon study (Register of Sales) cannot be concluded to be superior to the 
data In Taylor study (Australian Financial Review). This was due to the fact 
that the recorded option prices in the Register of Sales do not necessarily 
represent the time or sequence of the transaction but rather correspond 
only to the time when a trade was entered into the computer. 
Comments and Summary 
The early empirical work on the parity model by Stoll (1969) and Gould and Gala I 
(1974) suffered from poor data source. The option price data observed were 
nominated option price and may not correspond to actual ma~<et option price. 
Furthermore, both studies limited the test to option series which had exercise 
prtces equal to stock p~ce. (At the money opllons.) Notwithstanding these 
limitations, Stoll's finding of a significant positive relation betv-Jeen lhe relative call 
and put prices was enlightening. It was the one of the earlier empirical studies that 
confirmed the suspicion that there exists a relationship between the call and put 
price. The lact that the other regression coefficients do not correspond to the 
24 
1 
predicted model was assumed away. However it could be hypothesised that this 
possible deviation was due to the faci that Stoll was using the standard put-call 
parity theorem to test America options. That is, he failed to take into account the 
possibility of early exercise of the options. In fact, in his reply to Merton's (1974) 
objection, he argued that the possibility of early exercise and the consequence for 
the partty were slight. The other possible reason for the difference In mode~ 
predicted coefficient and regression coefficient was that the market was indeed 
Inefficient. 
Gould and Gaial (1974) In their test extended the parity model to take account of 
Merton's (1974) objection. Their major data still consisted of nominated price, 
though they were able lo get market price from the diaries of a single stock option 
broker. This market price was used to gauge the accuracy and bias of the 
nominated prtce. They also rejected the use of regression to determine market 
efficiency. They concluded that the model did not seem to be-supported by the 
result of the analysis. (Even when using the marl<et price and taking Into account 
transaction costs). Transaction costs were found to be a significant factor in the 
efficiency of American OTC option markets. The3e costs should be less slgnmcant 
In the organised option marl<et due to standardisation and the saving from having 
to match for buyer and seller. Thus, inefficiency in the OTC market is not 
surprising. There is a further possible reason that the market was found inefficient. 
Klemkosky and Resnick (1979) had argued successfully that the OTC market 
options were only partially dividend protected. Thus the Gould and Galai result 
could have been due to the omission of the dividend effects. 
Klemkoslcy and Resnick (1979, 1980) used the most refined parity model. Their 
model tal<es Into account the possibility of early e><ercise and dividend effect. 
Additionally, they do not limit their test to just at the money options. Their data 
source was also of higher quality as it had the times of trades and prices reported 
were mart<et determined. These allowed them to l>.g the arbitrage strategy to find 
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out whether ex ante analysis of the parity yields abnormal profits. Though most of 
the hedged portfolios showed no exploitable profits, the trading strategy triggered 
by signals that indicated ex post profit exceeding $40 still earned an average of 
$58 per hedge. Transaction costs were unable to eliminate this profit. Thus the 
marl<et showed some slgn of inefficiency even though these abnormal profits are 
rapidly wiped out by subsequent price adjustment: a result that is consistent with 
previous tests of market efficiency using other methodology. 
Following closely on the heels of the Klemkosky and Resnick (1980} studies, Phillip 
and Smith (1980) demonstrated the Importance of Implicit transaction costs such 
as bid/ask spread. Though most of the researchers agreed that transaction costs 
were Important, they only concentrated on explicit transaction costs such as 
commission, cost of floor trading and clearing fees. Phillip and Smiths 
demonstrated that the Implicit cost of bid ask spread required for the execution to 
exploit the abnormal .orofit was $50. This, coupled with the explicit costs, would 
have rendered the abnormal profit unexploltable. In fact, they show that the bid/ask 
spread will wipe out all previous reported abnormal profits found in the options 
market. Their article not only highlighted the Importance of the bid/ask spread, It 
also showed that apparent inefficiency In the options market could be due to 
certain hidden costs. 
It took two decades from the pioneering article of Stoll before the parity model was 
able to be used to test the efficiency of the AOM. The main problem was a lack of 
trading volume In put options. Loundon (1988} tested only a single option series 
(BHP}, though it did cover more than half of the options marl<et ot that time.22 
Furthermore, as noted In his introduction, the company was subject to tal<eover 
activity involving extensive option trading. The result of the analysis could 
therefore be firm ~nd/or period specific. These points were conceded by Loudon. 
22 The call (put) options accounted for 55% (72%) of total m?.1i<et volume and 74% (i1%) in 
total marl,et value for the period tested. 
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The surprtsing result of higher number of lower boundary violations than upper 
boundary violations could be due to the fact that there was selling or buying 
pressure on one of the securities which arose because of the takeover activity. A 
more diverse sample was chosen for the present study. 
The other studies by Gray (1989) did not confine the test to a single company 
option series. Though the methodology was not to compute the parity boundaries 
and analyse the frequency of the violations, the frequency of the violations could 
be calculated by the number of profitable long and short hodges. A long hedge 
would be profitable ff there Is an upper boundary violations and conversely a short 
hedge would be profitable when a lower boundary violations occurred.23 These can 
be Illustrated by noting that a long hedge was formed when call prices were 
relatively too high for put prices in the parity sense. To be consistent with Loudon's 
ex-post test, only Gray's ex-post resuns were used for comparison. Ex post resuns 
of 67 profitable short hedge and 90 profitable long hedge indicated that there were 
more lower boundary violations than upper boundary violations - which supports 
Loudon's finding. 
The result of Taylor's (1990) study does not support the finding of more lower 
boundary violations than upper boundary violations. But as there are serious 
doubts raised by Brown and Easton(1991, 1992), no inference was drawn from 
this study. 
A summary of the emplrlca! research on the parity model to test market efficiency 
is presented In Table 4. 
23 Arbitrage of a breach in upper boundary condition requires the construction of a long 
hedge while lower boundary condition requires construction of short hedge. 
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Table 4 
Summan:: of grevious studi~s of [:!p!-;eall~a!::!:tt_ relation 
Author (s) Data Source Market Methodology Conclusion 
Stud 
Stoll Nominated America Regression Parity model supported given 
(1969) price OTC option analysis of the imperfectness of data 
submission of market option series 
Put-call Dealers which are at 
P.ssociation the money. 
Gould and As above, but America Observation of Violations with exploitable 
Galai supplemented OTC option the frequency profit for stockbroker even 
(1974) by actual market of violation in after transaction costs. Models 
market price. the parity not supported and inefficiency 
model. in OTC option market. 
Klemkosky Market price America Formation of Ex post profitable for some 
and data listed option long and short hedged profit but ex ante 
Resnick market. hedge to analysis show that it is rapidly 
(1979, detect eliminated through 
1980) abnormal subsequent price adjustment. 
profit. 
Phillips As above As above As above Those ex ante profitable 
and Smith hedges were eliminated when 
(1980) implicit cost of bid ask spread 
are considered. 
Loudon Registered of Australian Observation of 1) AOM efficient after 
(1988) Sales Option the frequency considering transaction costs. 
Market of violations in 2) More lower boundary 
the parity violations than upper 
model. boundary violations. 
Gray Not Specified Australian Formation of Support market efficiency and 
(1989) Option long and short finding of more frequent lower 
MarJo;et hedge to boundary violations than 
detect upper boundary violations. 
abnormal 
roflt. 
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Research Design 
CHAPTER3 
RESEARCH 1\ilE.THODOL.OGY 
Using continuous discounting, the put-call pality theorem for American options 
over dividend paying stocks spec~ied the following boundary conditions: 
c- s + K + oe-rr ~P ..................... (5) 
c- s + Ke-rr ,; P .•.................... (6) 
The upper boundary condition, equation (5), specifies that the put price should be 
lower than the left hand side expression of C -S + K + De-rr, and the lower 
boundary oondition, equation (6), specifies that the put price should be greater 
thun the left hand side expression of C - S + Ke-rr. If there is a boundary condition 
violation then there is potential arbitre.ge opportunity which is 1noonsistent with an 
efficient market. An upper boundary violation is thus defined when C - S + K + 
oe-rr,; P and the upper violation size will be equal to C- s + K + oe-rr- P. 
Similarly, a lower boundary violation is defined when C- S +Ke-rr ~P wtth lower 
violation size calculated as C - S + Ke-IT- P. 
The research design is to gather data on equivalent call and put options. That is, 
put and call that relate to the same underlying stock and have same exercise price 
and time to maturily. These set of data are than used to compute the expression 
in (5) and (6) to see whether the boundary conditions hold in the AOM. 
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Dam Source 
The Australian Stock Exchange Journal publishes monthly trading statistics of all 
the options series traded in the AOM. For the period Jan 1991 to Dec 1991, it was 
observed that certain put options series were not traded at all or had very low 
trading volume. After careful analysis of the trading summary, it was decided to 
select the following option series for the test: BHP, CRA, WBC and WMC. These 
option series consistently have put monthly trading volumes of above 5,000 
contracts.27 The four option series together accounted for approximately half the 
total trading volume for call and put contracts and also represented more than half 
lhe total market value of call and put contracts traded in the AOM. Figure 1 shows 
the breakdown in market share of AOM.28 
100% (I) 
80% en 
o:l 60% .. 
"' ru 40% tl 
~ 20% (!) 
0.. 0% 
Nool Call 
Contracts 
No of Put 
Contracts 
Value of Call Value of Put 
Contracts Contracts 
[i6 BHP 0 CRA l@l WBC !II WMC !ill Olhe] 
Figure 1 (Share of Market) 
The four options series also represented a good mix of companies in Australia. 
Two of the companies are classified as industrial stocks (BHP and WBC) while the 
others represented the mining and resource sector (CRA and WMC). Possible 
company and sectoral specific effects can thus be examined in this study. Though 
the put-call parity theorem does not distinguish between companies or sectors, the 
different features in the companies or sectors could still have an effect on the 
frequency of observed violations. For example, certain firms or sectors may be 
27 The only exception are CRA June put monthly trading volume (4,879 contracts) and WBC 
September monthly trading volume (2,674 contracts). 
28 In 1991, the four option series accounted for 42% (58%) of the number of call (put) 
contracts in AOM and 58% (65%) of the total market value of call (put) contracts in AOM. 
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less actively traded than other. Given that If a firm or sector has less trading 
Interest relative to other firm or sector, arbitrage opportunHies would be left 
undetected for a longer period. Thus it Is expected that the less actively traded 
stocks will have more violations than the more actively traded stocks. 26 
Due to the prohibitively high costs of obtaining data direct from the AOM, an 
alternative data source had to be found.27 The source chosen was the Australian 
Financial Review's dally price list for options and stocks. The published options' 
data in Australian Financial Review are actually taken from the Dally Quote Sheet. 
Brown and Easton (1992) argued that on a priori grounds, the quality of using Dally 
Quote Sheet as data source is as good as the so-called "transaction data" in 
Register of Sales. This is because both data sources could generate non-
synchronous data that can cause significant error in a test of the put-call parity 
theorem. As noted by loudon (19811), the price relation of the three assets as 
specified by the put-cell parity theorem is only appropriate when they are based on 
the same information set. For puts and calls, the most important information set in 
determining price level is the price of the underlying share. Only when the prices of 
put and call are determined using the same traded share price level will there exist 
a put-call parity relation. In another words, the prices of the three assets must be 
observed at the same time or else there will not be a put-call parity relation. 
Though the Register of Sales has a "transaction time" listed In the records, the time 
stamped are actually the times when the data are entered Into the computer and 
not the time of transection. It Is therefore conceivable that puts traded hours apart 
from cans could be Incorrectly matched In the analysis, simply because the trading 
data are entered Into the computer at the same time. Similarly, If closing 
26 The idea of investigating possible company and sector specific effects are drawn from 
loudon's (1988, p.65) conclusion. 
27 The Register of Sales record used in loudon's study cost $90 per company per month 
while the Daily Quote Sheet mentioned in Brown and Easton (1992) and Taylor's (1989) 
article costs $2,000 for a year subscription. (Cost information supplied by the Australian 
Stock Exchange ltd in Perth) 
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price are used, non synchronous price observation is conceivable given that the 
closing trades could be recorded at different time. For example, one of the assets 
(say the put) could have been traded in the early half of the trading day but not 
thereafter, while the other asset (say the call) was last traded at the end of the 
trading day. It would then be Incorrect to use the closing prices of these two assets 
for the analysis since the two assets would be priced according to share prices at 
the different times. 28 
In order to reduce the problem of non-synchronous data, the following data filtering 
rules were used:29 
(i) The closing price of the put Is recorded only when It has non zero trading 
volume and non-zero closing price. Additionally, only a closing put price 
which falls within the bid/ask spread Is used for the analysis. 
(II) The closing price of the corresponding call, (that Is the call that has the 
same exercise price, maturity and underlying stock as the put) Is also 
recorded only when It satisfies similar conditions of non-zero trading volume 
and non zero closing price falling within the bid/ask spread. 
(Ill) A check Is made that the underlying stock Is traded on the day In 
question and that the closing share price falls within the bid/ask spread. 
(lv) Only data that satisfies these three conditions are used for the analysis. 
By ensuring that all assets were traded on the day, the gross form of Inter-day non-
synchronous price observations is eliminated. That Is, the mismatch of puts with 
calls or stocks that were In fact traded on different days Is eliminated. Use of prices 
that fall only within the bid-ask spread also further reduces temporal mismatch. It 
should be noted that the bid-ask spreads are re-established at the end of each day 
and the bid (ask) quote is the price at which registered traders or specialists stand 
28 For a more detail discussion on the difference between the two data sources see Brown 
and Easton (1991, p.9-10). 
29 The data filtering rules are adapted from Brown and Easton (1992, p. 6) 
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ready to buy/sell the asset. 30 Assets that are only traded early in the day with no 
transaction thereafter could show up when the market at the end of the day re-
establishes a new bid/ask spread. For example, the closing price of a put which 
was transacted early in the day at 10 cents based on a $2 underlying share price 
would no longer fall into the bid/ask spread if the share price had moved to a new 
level (say $3) by the end of the day. Given that the bid/ask spread Is the price level 
that registered traders or specialists stand ready to transact, It is most likely that It 
Is established using the latest Information set. 31 This bid/ask spread condition also 
has the effect of reducing the bid/ask cost documented in Phillips and Smith (1981) 
article. In particular, It would also ensure that an Investor can buy or sell the assets 
at the closing price recorded. Finally, the elimination of zero priced assets Is to 
account for the objection by Brown and Easton (1992, footnote 10). They argued 
that put-can parity Involves an arbitrage test and thus assets should not have a 
zero price because profits can be obtained simply by acquiring maximum quantities 
of these assets if they exist. 
RiskFreemte 
To arbitrage any put-cell parity vloletion, the arbitrageur must be able to borrow or 
lend at the risk free rate. In addition the rate must be looked In, otherwise the 
portfolio profit wiD not be risk free. This would mean that the risk free rate used for 
the discounting factor must be for the period to the option's maturity. For example, 
to arbitrage a mls-priced pair of put and can option series with maturity of 90 days 
requires that the arbitrageur be able to borrow or lend at the 90 days risk free rate. 
A dally risk free rate is Inappropriate as the rate may fluctuate between days and 
30 Registered traders. are the market makers in option market while their counterparts in 
stock market are the specialist. 
31 I am grateful to Professor Brown of Monash for pointing out the advantage of using 
bid/ask spreads as a mean of reducing non-synchronous data. 
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the arbitrageur will not be able to look In his position, say to cover the possible 
dividend payout, for a risk free profit. Unfortunately, it Is not possible to get the risk 
free rate or its proxy to cover all the options' maturity periods. 32 
The closest proxy for the risk free rate is the Treasury note rate. As noted In all 
Australian put-call parity articles, the infrequent trading of the Treasury note results 
In there being no rates available for numerous days. Thus, the study will only uee 
the dally published Authorised Dealers Bank Bill (AD) rate In the Australian 
Financial Review given that this rate Is more readily available. The AD rates were 
reported for maturities of 30, 90 and 180 days. Depending on the maturities of the 
options the rate is chosen so as to be as close as possible to the option's 
maturity. 33 The rates are than adjusted to reflect the maturity length of the options. 
The Australian Merchant Bankers Bill (AMBA) rates wiU also be used to examine 
the Impact of using different discounting rates. 34 
Sample Period Study 
In an attempt to reduce the number of variables In the test and the measurement 
error of variables, It was decided to limit the period of test to Include only periods 
where the stocks do not pay dividends. This has the effect of reducing the upper 
boundary condition to only C- S + K > P. The added advantage is that no risk free 
rates are used In the test of upper boundary condition and thus the result Is robust 
32 The importance of getting the risk free rate to correspond with the maturity of the options 
was again highlighted to me by Brown. 
33 In particular, options maturity of 0-60 days used 30 days AD rate as the discounting rate, 
61-120 days used 90 days AD rate while options with maturity greater than 120 days used 
160 days AD rate. 
34 It should be noted that the Treasury bill rate is usually 0.5% less than the AD rate which is 
0.5% less than the AMBA rate. In addition, all previous put-call parity articles found that the 
result of the test are insensitive to the rate used. 
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to the effect of using different discounting method (discrete and continuous) and 
different risk free estimate (T-note, AD and AMBA rates). 
The sample to be studied Is thus limited to option series that were traded and 
which matured prior to the ex-dividend dates of the underlying stocks. The 
Australian Stock Exchange Journal is used to obtain the ex-dividend dates of the 
stocks. For the BHP option series, the observed price data consist of options that 
were traded after 13/06/91 and matured prior to 4/11/91. The first date corresponds 
to the first ex-dividend date while the second corresponds to the next dividend 
payment ex-dividend date. Thus within this period of study no dividend Is InvolVed. 
Similarly, the sample period for CRA Is 12/04/91 to 13/10/91, WBC 6/06/91 to 
3/01/92 and for WMC 26/03/91 to 7/10/91. 
Hypothesis Tested 
Given that In an efficient market, there should not be any significant number of put-
can parity violations for arbitrage opportunities, the first major testable hypothesis Is 
asfoHows: 
H1 : There will be an Insignificant number of upper and lower boundary 
violations after netting transaction costs. (in an efficient market) 
Loudon (1968, p. 56 -57) in his analysis argued that on a theoretical ground, upper 
boundary condition should be more restrictive than lower boundary condition. This 
Is because of stock short selling restrictions and dividend uncertainty In the upper 
boundary condition. Thus, one would expect to observe more upper boundary 
violations than lower boundary violations. GIVen that for the period covered In this 
study short seUing of stock is permitted and that the sample specifically exclude 
dividends, the upper and lower boundary condition would thus be exPected to be 
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equally restrictive. Thus, It is hypothesised that there should not be any significant 
difference in the frequency of upper and lower boundary violations and violation 
sizes. 
H2.1 : There Is no significant difference in the frequency of observed upper 
boundary violations and lower boundary violations. 
H2.2 : There is no significant difference in the observed upper boundary 
violation size and lower boundary parity violation size. 
Since put-caR parity does not distinguish among firms or sectors, there should not 
be any significant difference In the number of boundary violations. Though it should 
be noted that the significant test of difference In violation size among firms are not 
conducted. This is because after the data filtering rule, the data set for each 
Individual firms will have different mixes of exercise price and time to maturity. 
Thus, the violation size will be significantly different given that the violation size Is 
calculated using exercise price and time to maturity.35 The third hypothesis tested 
Is thus: 
H3 : There Is no significant difference in the frequency of boundary violations 
among companies and sectors. 
Recall that only lower boundary condition of the put-call parity requires risk free 
borrowing. Drawing from Loudon's (1988) argument, the effecl of Institutional 
restrictions on the required risk free borrowing win be more pronounced on longer 
term data series than on shorter term ones, thus the next hypothesis to be tested 
Is: 
H4 : The frequency of lower boundary violations will be greater for options with 
longer terms to maturity. 
35 I am again indebted to Professor Brown for pointing out that the violation size among firm 
will differ significantly. 
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Again following from loudon's (1988) article, it Is hypothesised that since in the 
AOM there Is more active trading of options which are "In the money'' than of those 
which are "out the money", the violation on "in the money" options should be 
detected and arbitraged away more often than In the case of "out the money" 
options. Essentially, a lack of trading Interest In •out the money" options would 
allow large violations to go undetected for a longer period, with the effect that the 
number of violations In "out the money" options would be greater compared to "In 
the money'' boUndary violations. 
H5 : The frequency of boundary violations wiH be greater for "In the money'' 
options than "out the money'' options. 
Statistical Analytical Technlquesas 
To determine whether significant difference existed between sets of variables, two 
statistical tests wiD be utilised. These are the chi-square test and t-test. Chi-square 
test is only applicable for nominal data that are Independent while a t-test requires 
Interval data for the calculation of significant difference. Given that the frequency of 
boUndary violation are nominal data, chi-square test will be utilised to test 
hypotheses that concern significant difference between the violation rates. 
Similarly, given that the violation size and boundary conditions are stated In terms 
of dollars amount (interval data), t-test will be used in analysing the violation size 
and boundary conditions. The significant difference in the test Is exhibited In the 
probability value, thus the lower the probability value the more significance Is the 
difference between the tested variables. Since chi-square and t-test only report 
whether the tested variables are significantly related but not how strong is the 
36 This section draws heavily from materials found in Levin's (1987) statistics for 
Management book. 
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relation, a Spearman rank correlation test was also used in testing the strangth of 
the relation. Spearman rank correlation value range from +1 (strong positive 
relation) to -1(strong negative position). The Spearman rank correlation test Is 
used only when the data can be ranked and slnoo the only variables In this study 
that can be ranked is the time to maturity, this test Is utilised In testing the strangth 
of the relation betwaen time to maturity and the obeerved violation rates In 
hypothesis 4. Finally the confldenoo level of the test is set at 95% or 5% 
elgnlfloanoo level. That is, the chanoo of rejecting a null hypothesis when It Is true 
(type I error) Is 5%. 
Advantages and disadvantages of ~sting the put-call parity 
condition as a means of examining market efftclency 
Before leaving the dloousslon on research design, the relative merits and 
drawbacks of uelng the parity relation for testing the el'fk:lency of the AOM requires 
comment. 
At tha risk of sounding repetitive, the main advantage of using tha put-call 
parity condition as a test of merket efficiency is to overoome the problem of 
a joint test hypothesis. If no pricing model Is specified, any Inefficiency 
found cannot be attributed to model mls-spoolfk:atlon. Thus the argument Is 
that the put-cell parity allows a direct test of market emcleooy. Put-call parity 
has the added advantage of minimising assumptions. There Is no 
specification of whet Investors• attitudes to risk are or about the process 
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generating asset returns. To ensure that any arbitrage prom will be totally 
eliminated in an efficient market the only assumption Is that Investors prefer 
more wealth to less and that tradlngs are frictionless. Though as noted by 
Loudon (1988, p. 54), trade to exploit arbitrage opportunities require perfect 
market and thus he argues that put-can parity analyses are not Independent 
of Institutional struciures. 
Variables are observable 
Another advantage of using the put-caH parity theorem Is that most of the 
variables In the parity model are directly observable. The possible exception 
Is the risk free rate but eli models that require risk free discounting of a 
future value will also encounter this problem. Ignoring the Inevitable 
problem of estimating the risk free rate, the put-can parity model does not 
require an estimate of the standard deviation of the stock price as doss the 
B&S option pricing model. All the variables (caR, put, exercise, stock price 
and maturity) are dlrecily observable In the market and thus do not give rise 
to errors in measurement. 
Disadvantages of using put-call parity In test of market efficiency 
Synchronisation of data 
As noted In earlier sections, one of the major problems In put-can parity 
analysis Is to ensure that the prices observed are sychronised. If the data 
are non-synchronised, then It Is erroneous to classify any violation found as 
violation of the. put-can parity condition with resultant arbitrage 
opportunities. The data fllterln!J rule used In this study will eliminate the 
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gross form dally mismatch of the three assets but withil1 the day there is stiH 
scope for temporal mismatch. Thet is, It is possible thet options are 
matched with stocks which are traded hours apart or vice versa. 
Nonetheless, as noted by Gray (1989, p.153) the non-synchronous data Is 
not expected to present systematic bias over the sample. 
Interestingly, Loudon's (1988) analysis found that the impact of price non-
simultaneity on the frequency and size of violations was Insignificant. He 
did, ceutlon, though that the result could be due to possible stock price 
stability, which reduces the impact of matching cells and puts at different 
stock price levels, rather than to insignificant Impact of oon simultaneity of 
price observation. 
The other major problem In this study Is that It is an ex post test. Galal 
(1978, p. 194) argues that ex post tests based on boundary condition cen 
only conclude whether the relevant markets are synchronised or whether 
they are in continuous equilibrium. The results of such tests cannot be used 
to draw conclusions on the efficiency of the market. To exploit ex post 
arbitrage opportunities the asset prices must remain unchanged for the 
arbitrageur to set up the hedge portfolio. Therefore, it Is conceded that a 
more stringent test of market efficiency would be to study ex-ante violation 
and to see Whether arbitrage opportunities persist ex post. Nonetheless, as 
noted in Brown and Easton (1992) the available data set are not based on 
actual times of trade. To get a long enough period of transaction timed data 
Is difficult and costly.1 Thus, given the data limitation It would be difficult to 
1 When the Register of Sales data are inputed in a more frequent and shorter time period, 
the data Input time will approach the actual transaction data. Alternatively, the researcher 
would have to sit in the market and record the observed assets price as soon as they are 
transacted. 
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conduct a true ex-ante analysis of the put-call parity but the evidence 
collected could be considered as preliminary results till better data are 
available. 
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CHAPTER4 
RESUlTS AND ANAlYSIS 
Violations of Boundaries 
Table 5 provides the summary statistics for the observed boundary violations 
using the continuous discounting method and Authorised Dealers Bank Bill rate as 
risk free proxy. The "number of violations" row shows the number of cases In the 
sample where the upper and lower boundary conditions are not satisfied. That is, 
tor upper boundary condition a violation occurs when c -S + K < P and lower 
boundary violation occurs when C - S + Ke-rr> P. The upper violation size is the 
amount of left hand side expression (C - S + K) excaed the put price and the lower 
violation size is the amount of put price exceeding the left hand side expression of 
c - S+Ke-rr. The ''violation rate" Is the frequency of violations occurring in the 
sample. The equation for upper (eq. 5) and lower (eq. 6) boundary conditions are 
again reproduced below41: 
C-S+K ;;;, p ..................... (5) 
c - s + Ke-rr s; p ...................... (6) 
Table$ 
Summary of Violations (Continuous discounting factor and Authorised Dealers Bank Bill 
rate as risk free proxy) 
Upper Boundary lower Boundary 
Number of Observations 1164 1164 
Number of Violations 74 214 
Mean violation size ($) 0.0314 0.0223 
Standard Deviation ($) 0.0267 0.0013 
Maximum violation size ($) 0.1300 0.1017 
Minimum violation size ($) 0.0050 0.000033 
Violation Rate 6% 18% 
41 Given that the sample in this current study excludes dividends, the dividend 'term is 
droped in the upper boundary condition, equation (5). 
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Given that only too lower boundary condition uses too risk free rate for dlscoontlng 
too exercise price, too Impact of using different dlscoontlng methods and different risk 
free rate estimates wiD only affect the lower boundary violations. This Is shown In 
table 6. A comparison of table 5 and table 6 reveals that too effect of using different 
disoountlng methods and risk free rate estimates Is minimal. Too lower violation rate 
ranges from 16% to 18% and too mean violation siZe ranges from $0.0221 to $0.0223 
depending on too dlscoonting factor and risk free estimate. Given that too violation 
frequency and violation size varied only slightly, too foRewing analysis wiD only use 
oontinoous discounting with too Authorised Dealers rate as too risk free proxy. 
The results for too risk free proxy (AD v AMBA rate), supporls pravlous studies where 
the use of different risk free proxies were found not to have any slgnlflcl:lnt Impact on 
put-ca~ parity analysis. 42 However, It shoold be noted that It Is st!U imporlsnt to use 
too risk free security with maturity closest to the maturity of too parity porlfoDo, The 
result only oonflrmed too empirical facts that too use of different available risk free 
proxlas wiD not affect too result of put-call parity analysis. 
Table6 
Effect of different~ lll1lrihods and risk free estimates on the lower bou!!da!y 
AD Rata MBA Rata 
Continuous Discrete Continuous Discrete 
C..S+Ke4T C· S+KI(1+r}T C-s+Ke4T C· S+K1(1+r}1 
Number of Observations 1164 1164 1164 1164 
Number of Violations 214 197 187 191 
Mean violation size($) 0.0223 0.0224 0.0221 0.0224 
standard Deviation ($) 0.0013 0.0013 0.0183 0.0164 
Yaxi11111m violation size ($) 0.1017 0.1018 0.1002 0:1003 
Yini11111m violation size ($) 0.000033 0.000089 0.00018 0.0001 
Violation Rate 18% 17% 16% 16% 
42 See Loundon (1988, Table 2), Taylor (1989, footnote 10) and Brown and Easton (1992, 
footnote 8). 
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Market Efficiency (Hypothesis 'I) 
Out of the total number of 1164 observations, there were 74 cases of upper boundary 
violations and 214 cases of lower boundary violations.43 That Is, only 74 cases of the 
data observed reported findings of upper boundary violations 
(C - S + K < P) while 214 cases reported lower boundary violations 
(C - S + Ke-rr> P). These translate to an upper violation rates of 6% and lower 
violation rates of 18%. The mean violation size (arbitrage profitability) was $0.0314 
and $0.0223 for upper and lower boundary violations respectively. Using Loudon's 
( 1988) estimate of typical transaction costs Involved In arbitraging a put-call parity 
violation, the transaction costs would range from $0.63 to $0.21, depending on the 
option series being arbitraged. (Sse Appendix A for calculation of transaction costs.) 
Given that the maximum violation sizes for upper and lower boundary conditions were 
$0.13 and $0.1017, none of the violations are profitable enough for arbllraglng a 
breach In the put-caR parity relation. The only traders that might reap an economic 
profit44 from trading In parity violations are traders who can escape brokerage costs. 
Nonetheless, if Implicit costs such as bid-ask spreed are accounted for, even they are 
unable to profit from a put-call parity violation. 45 Note though that transaction costs 
can only explain why arbllrage opportunities are not exploited but it cannot explain 
43 The preliminarily analysis of upper boundary violation shows 106 cases of upper boundary 
violation with a violation rate of 9% but a closer examination reveals that there were 32 cases 
where the left hand side expression (C-S+K) yield negative or zero amounts. Given Brown and 
Easton's objection that put call parity are an arbitrage test and as such should not have any 
zero or negative priced security or portfolio, these cases are eliminated for the analysis. No 
zero or negative priced portfolio was found in the analysis of the lower boundary condition. 
44 Economic profit as defined by Jensen (1978). 
45 Even without invoking implicit transection costs, the number of traders who can escape both 
option and stock brokerage fees will be minimum. This is because they must be exchange 
members of both th~ option and stock market in order to escapa the total brokerage fees. 
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why arbitrage opportunities exlst.MI Nonetheless, Taylor (1990, p. 211) argued that 
unexploltable arbitrage opportunities are consistent with an efficient market. 
To test the significance of the put-caR boundary conditions, a simple paired t-test was 
conducted using the entire sample. The mean of the left hand side expression 
(C-S+K) of equation (5) was compared with the mean put price (P) for the upper 
boundary oonditloo. The mean put price was In tum tested against the mean of the 
left hand side expression (C-S+Ke-IT) of equation (6) for the lower boundary 
oonditioo. 
For the upper boundary condition, eq. (5), the mean left hand side expression 
(M'"0.3689) was found to be significantly greater than the mean put price (M=0.2587), 
t .. 34.5128, p < .001. The mean put price was In rum slgnlflcently greater than the 
mean left hand side expression (M..0.2149) of the lower boundary condition, eq (6), 
t = 27.4921,p < .001. The t-test thus support the hypothesis that the Inequalities of 
the boundary conditions. The low frequency of vlolatloos being obeerved and giVen 
that none of the trade in parity vkllatioo are profitable net of transaction costs also 
attest to the efficiency of AOM in the time period of the study. 
Upper and lower boundary conditions (Hypothasis 2) 
From table 5, It can be seen that the rate of violation of the upper boundary condition 
(6%) Is much lower compared to the lower boundary vloletloo rate of 18%. The 
difference between the average upper vloletlon and lower vlclatlon sizes is significant, 
t .. 3.18, p<.002. The result Is consistent with Loundon (1988), Gray (1989) and 
46 See loudon (1988, p, 61, footnote 9) and Taylor (1990, p. 211) 
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Brown and Easton (1992) findings that there is more lower boundal)' violations than 
upper boundal)' violations. 
Though the results confirmed previous studies that the lower boundal)' Is violated 
more than the upper boundal)', the results are stiH puzzling. loudon (1988) argues 
that on theoretloal grounds the upper boundal)' condition should be more restrictive 
than the lower boundal)' condition because of short seHing restrictions and dividend 
uncertainty. That Is, restrictions on the short selling required for arbitraging an upper 
boundal)' violation, would ensure .that there are more upper boundal)' violations than 
lower boundal)' violations. Similarly, given that the dividend payout in the upper 
boundal)' Is uncertain, It would again be expected that within a sample data there 
would be more upper boundal)' violations than lower boundal)' violations. Given that 
in this study, short seDing of stocks Is permissible in the sample period and that 
dividends are excluded from the study, the effed Is that the upper boundal)' 
conditions are no longer as restrictive relative to the lower boundal)'. Thus 
theoreticaHy we would expect In this study, the difference In violation rates and 
violation sizes between upper and lower boundal)' to be Insignificant. This Is not 
supported by the result of the analysis and thus hypothesis 2.1 and hypothesis 2.2 are 
rejeded. 
However, it should be noted that the mean size of violation of the upper boundal)' is 
now significantly greater than that in respect to the tower boundal)'. This is In contrast 
to loudon's study where he found a significantly higher mean violation size for the 
tower boundal)' than the upper boundal)'. AddHionaHy, the lower violation rate of 18% 
is also lower than loudon's reported lower violation rate of 38.5%. Furthermore, the 
maximum violation size of this study was only $0.13 (upper boundal)' violation size) 
while loudon reported a maximum violation size of $0.33. (lower boundary violation 
size) This oould be due to the learning effect aUuded by loudon In his ooncluslon. 
Effec:t of dlffenmt firms and Hdors (Hypothesis 3) 
Since the put-call parity theorem does not distinguish between firms or sectors, It Is 
therefore not expecled thet a significant difference should be found In violation rates 
among firms and sectors. Table 7 shows the breakdown In the parity analysis across 
the four firms. Among the four firms, the uppar boundary violation rate ranged from· 
6% to 6% With mean violation size ranging from $0.0131 to $0.033~ while the lower 
boundary violation rate ranged from 15% to 25% with maan violation size ranging 
from $0.0168 to $0.0327. 
Table7 
Industrial Sector Resource and Uilling Sector 
001" wee CM WMC 
Upper !..ower Upper !..ower UIP!Pfi a.- Upper !..ower 
No. of Observations 543 543 161 161 212 212 248 248 
l\lo. of Violations 33 82 8 35 18 35 15 62 
llllean viollriioo size 0.0335 0.0243 0.0131 0.0169 0.0484 0.0327 0.0183 0.0168 
Standard DeY 0.0284 0.0180 0.0085 0.0203 0.0304 0.0241 0.0079 0.0115 
llllax. viollriioo size 0.1300 0.0757 0.0250 0.0687 0.1300 0.1017 0.0300 0.0455 
Uin. viollriioo size 0.0050 0.0001 0.0050 0.0005 0.0100 0.0003 0.0050 3.3E-05 
V'!olatioo Rate 6% 15% 5% 22% 8% 17% 6% 25% 
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To test whether the difference In violation rates among the firms are significant, a chi-
square test was conducted. This is shoWn in table 8. The x_2 statistica support the 
hypothesis that there Is no significant difference In violation rates across the four 
firms for the upper boundary conditions but surprisingly, there Is a significant 
difference In lower boundary violation rates across the four firms, x_2 (3, N "' 1164) "' 
12.839, p< .005 
Upper l:lmmdary lower Boundary 
Comply Violatiom; Comply Violatiom; Total 
BHP 510 33 461 82 543 
CRA 194 18 177 35 212 
WBC 233 15 100 82 248 
WMC 153 a 1.26 35 161 
Total 1090 74 950 214 1164 
X2 = 2.253, P<.5216 X2= 12.839, P<.005 
Given that the sample periods for the four firms do not coincide exaclly, the 
significant difference In the lower boundary violation ratas could be due to the 
different trading days. That Is, It Is hypothesised that there may be certain trading day 
where the mal1cet Is more active than others and when the mal1cet Is active, arbitrage 
opportunities will be detected more quickly. Compared to a less active trading day 
where arbitrage opportunities wiD not be detected for a longer period than an active 
trading day. The x_2tests were conducted again using data observations restricted to 
trading period common to the four firms (13/06/91-7/10/91). Table 9 shows the parity 
status for the four firms during the common period. 
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TableS 
a.-~ !!?Srity !l!!!!tw for the =-l!?!l'ioc!! (13f!!U!1-7110191l 
ComplY Violations Total 
limP 341 49 390 
CAA 98 23 121 
WI3C 101 32 133 
Mile 102 23 125 
Total 642 127 769 
f ::.10.7747, p < .01301 
The result for the ;t2 test shows that there Is still a significant difference In violation 
mtes across the four films, ;t2 (3, .M .. 769) .. 10.7747, p.<.01301 Evan thoogh the 
significant level has dropped from p<.OO!S to p<.01301, the c:llfl'emnce in tmdlng days 
still cenoot explain the observed significant diffemnce In lower violation mtes among 
the four firms. 
The possibility of a low trading volume effect was putfolward by loudon (1988, p. 
65). He argued that in a leSs than perfect market, options which have low trading 
volume will be expected to have a larger violation mte since altlltmge opportunities 
for tha less tmded options are likely to remain l!l'ldeteded·for &·longer period. Gillen 
that BHP has the highest tmdtng activity In the stock and options markat It Is thus 
expected to have the loWeSt violation rates. Among the four firms, BHP Indeed has 
the 1owsat 1llolatioo mte for lower boundary oondltkmS (15%). Nonetheless, when we 
look at CAA which haS the lowest call and put trading volume among the sample four 
firms, It was found that It haS the second lowest lower boundary violation mtes (17%). 
Thus the evidence that the more actively tmded firmS have lower violation mtes Is 
mixed and Inconclusive. 
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Examining across sectors, the combined upper violation mtes for the "Industrial" 
sector (BHP and WBC) and the "resource" sector (CRA and WMC) are 5% and 7% 
respectively, while the oombined lowervlolatloo rates are 17% and 21% respectively. 
Too result of the x2 test supports the hypothesis that tt1are Is oo slgnlflc::ent difference 
In v1o1at1oo retes across sectors. See table 10. 
Table 10 
P!!'lty tlt.i!Ws !!!!I'OSS ~ 
743 
347 
1090 
48 
26 
74 
a.-~ 
Comply v~ 
647 144 
303 70 
950 214 
:r.2=0.34660, p<0.55&15 
Effect of time to maturity (Hypothesis 4) 
Total 
791 
373 
1164 
Since discounting of the exercise price is only required In specifying the lower 
boundary (and oot In specifying the upper), "time to maturity" will affect only the 
former boundary. As argued by loudon (1988), the reason that the longer maturity 
options are expecled to show a higher violation rete Is that the fisk free proxy Is not a 
true risk free rate and any divergence between the rates will be more pronounced as 
time to maturity lengthens. He thus argued that the effect of time to maturity oould be 
a proxy for Institutional restrictions on risk free borroWing. TOO effect of time to 
maturity on tlla put-call parity relation Is shoWn In table 11. 
Too 12 statistics shOW that there Is a slgnmcant association between the time to 
maturity and the obSeMid violation rate while the Speerman rank correlation shows a 
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strong Inverse relationship between the violation mte and the time to meturity. 
Thoogh the hypothesis predicts that the loWeSt violation mte and violation size should 
be in the longest time group (>120days), the msult shows that the second longest 
group has the loWeSt violation Rites and violation size. A similar msult ll'r.IS aloo found 
In loocloo's study. 47 
Table '11 
Time to "'"otliil h. of ~ lllleara Std 
~ Ob!ulr- ~ Rate ($) ow. 
.., 
--
($) 
C-30 385 104 27% .02387 .02075 
31 ... 312 67 17% .02118 J)1743 
61-80 249 29 8% .02165 .01570 
111-120 140 5 1% .00954 .01383 
120> 78 9 2% .02150 .01629 
x2 =51.5 , p<.0001 
rank correlation=-0.9. 
It ll'r.IS obSerVed In the sample that the trading volume for calls that are •tn the mooey" 
ll'r.IS significantly greater than that «lf calls that am •oot «lf the money". Figure 2 givas 
the bmakdown In trading volunle for calls in terms d •1n", "at" or •out d" the money 
category. 
47 ThoUgh it should be noted that his time to maturity category is slightly different from this 
study. 
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P r o p or lio n o I C all 11 a d in g v o lu m e th a t a 1 e "in". "a t" 
36% 
Flaure2 
o 1 "o 111" 11111 m o 1111 .1' 
r-~·-----------. 
·llilln lhe Money 
1111 A I 
1111 0 utlhe M onev 
Given that options with lower trading volume are expected to have potential arbitrage 
opportunities undetected for longer, It would thus be expected that oolls that are •oot 
of the money" would show slgl'llfiOOntly greater violation rete than •1n the money" calls. 
Table 12 shows the parity analysis for "In" or "out of the money" calls. To be 
oonslstent with loodon's study, the "at the money" oolls are classified as "oot of the 
LlpM' Bmmcfm: 
CatGgory Total No. of Viola- Violation Rate stc:IJDw 
Clbservati- tioos 
11'1 711 46 6.5% 0.1115 0.1102 
Out 453 28 6.2% 0.1081 0.1089 
'1.2 =0.03875, p<.8439 
l...ow!r Bmmcfm: 
in 711 113 15.9% 0.0448 0.0505 
Out 453 101 22.3% 0.0423 0.000 
r =7.560, p<.ooo 
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The lower boundary exhibits a significant relation between the observed violation 
rates and the category of "In" or "out" of the ~calls while the upper OOI..mdary 
relationship Is not significance. The violatloo rates for bofh the upper and lower 
violation am In the direction specified by the hypothesis. That Is, the "out of the 
money" calls show a higher violation rate than do the "In the money" caRs. 
loudon's ( 1988) study further partition the call into deep in and deep "out of the 
money". It is not cleer what the~ of this exercise is, given that the low trading 
volume effect pmdk:ts only that "In the money" calls (which are more l'dlvely traded) 
shoold have a lower violation mtes than •out of tha money" calls. Since the degree of 
calls "In the money" is altlltmry, It is dlfl'k:ult to ascertain a level for identifying whether 
tha deepar the call tha more trading volume is observed. For example, Within a data 
set a call thet Is classify as deep In when stock price exceed exercise prlca by 10c wiD 
dellnltely heve more trading volume than a call classify as deep In with the out-off 
point at 20c. That Is because tha 20c deep In calls now exclude the trading volume for 
tha previous 10c "In the money" calls. If the cut-off point Is set high enough there w!U 
not be any trade observed within the deep "In the money" caDs category! Thus, the 
trading volumes alloW one to observed whether AOM traders prefer "In" or •out of tha 
money'' calls but not be able to extend the obseMition to discover the category of 
deep "In the money" options, traders In AOM would prefer. 
To further examine the significant relation round between "In" or "out" of the money 
calls and lower boundary condition, the four lndMdual firms were tested In lsoistlon; 
Table 13 shoWS the crosstabulation table for the violation rates. Only BHP shOW a. 
significance relation between "In" or "out" of the money call category and the loWer 
violation rate, f (1,N- 54')=4.32~. p<.03754. The other firms, eRA (p<.8594), 
WBC (p<.3749), and WMC (p<.1129) all shOW Insignificant relatioo between In or out 
call category and the lower Violation rates. Nonetheless, the lower v~tion mtes for 
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for "In the mooey" calls were l'oolld to be~ smaller then "out of the mooey", 
except for WBC which 1100 lower vlolafion rates being slightly smaller In "out of the 
money" options tl'lliln "In the money" options. Tlms the evidence support the 
hypothesis that the less actively traded "out of the money" calls have. more violations 
then the more actively traded "In the money" calls. 
T*e13 
limP CRA liii8C WMC 
~ Comply 'If~<>~!!- Comply VIOla- Comply Vl<>la- Comply 
~ ~ ti-
In 85.3'1(, 14.7% 83.9'11. 16.1% 77.1% 22.9'11. 83.0'11. 
OUt 80.5% 19.5% 83.0% 17.0'11. 72.2'111 27.8% 72.2'111 
VIOla-
tilmS 
17.0% 
27.3% 
-f-=4.3257, £2. =0.0313, "1!-=0.7873, x2 =2.5132, 
p<.03754 p<.8594 p<.3749 p<.1129 
Conclusion 
The primary objective of the study Is to gather EMdence on the efflcleooy of the 
AustraUan Options MarnEll The l'eSI.IIts support the finding that AOM Is highly efficient 
In the period study. Breaches of the put-caU parity boolldarles (upper alld lower) were 
foond to be lnfreqUellt. Even when the boulldary oondltlons are violated, the arbitrage 
opportunities were not exploitable. This Is because the transaction costs exceed the 
potential arbitrage proms. Tt~oogt~·transactJon costs cannot explain the exlstenca of 
arbltraga opportunltle&, the fact that arbitrage opportunities are Mexploitable 1s 
oonslstant with notloil' of market efl'lclency. 
The lnfreq1.100t vlolatloos of put-call parity boundaries also IndiCate that prk:lng 
relation between puts and calls are maintained Ill the Australian market. Thus the 
empirical evidence in Austmlla supports the prk:lng relatloo of the put-call panty 
model. lower boolldauy \llolatloos occur more often then upper boolldauy \llolatloos. 
This Is despite the fact that removal of lnstltutloosl restriction oo short sale of stocks 
and dividends uncerlalnty should make both boundauy oondltloos to be equally 
restridllle. In addition, the lower bol.mdauy oooditlon of put-call parity ralatloo appears 
to be affected by c:ompanles specific effect, Uma to maturity effect and the effect of 
llllhether optloos Is "In" or "out the money" effect. No such ralatloo was found between 
the upper boondauy oooditlon and the wrloos effects. 
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CHAPTER& 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The primal}' aim of this study was to Investigate the maritet efficiency of the AOM. 
Though there ware substantial numbers of previous studies OOilducted In exploring 
the maritet efficleooy of the AOM, they ware studied under different Institutional 
structure. The Institutional structure changes inclucle Introduction of spot options and 
removal of restrictions em short Hie of stocks. 
The second objdlle of the study was to gather empli1cal evidence em the put-ooU 
parity theorem. ~.the effects of time to maturity and options being "In the 
money" em put-ooU parity relation ware examined. Additionally, this study also 
explored the oompany and sector effect which was only reported In Taylor's (1900) 
study. Though es noted prevloualy, there Is esrlous doubts mise em Ills 
methodologies and therefore Ills results are questionable. 
CaH, put and stock prices ware ooilooted from the National Maritet sections of the 
Australian Financial Review. Risk free rate was estimated using Aulllorlset! Dealers 
Bank Btu rate and Austrauan Merchant Bankers Bill rate which was also available In 
the Australian Fimmelal Review. Tills data ware then enter Into the put-ool parity 
bol.mdary equations, reproduced below. 
c -s + I< :!: p ..................... (5) 
C-S+Ke-rr ,;;;p •••••••••••••••••••••• (6) 
A violation is defined when the parity boondary OO!ldltions were oot satisfied. These 
violations represent arbitrage opportunities. Since In an efficient market there should 
oot be any arbltmge opportunities, vlolatloo rete Is thus an Indication of the market 
efficiency In the AOM. Additionally, various effects oo put-call parity reletion were also 
examined. The results of the analysis are summarised below. 
Summary of Results 
Market Efficiency (Hypothesis 'I) 
The first test involved calculetlng the violation mtes and violation size. Given that In 
an efficient market there should oot be any significant number of put-can parity 
violations, the first hypothesis tested (stated In the allemate foml) Is: 
H1: Thare wiD be an Insignificant number of upper and lower boundary parity 
violations after netting transaction oost In an efficient market. 
Of the 1164 observations, 74 cases of uppar boundary violations and 214 cases of 
lower boundary vlolanons were observed. These translate to an upper vlolanon mte of 
6% and lower violation rate of 18%. Nona of the breaches In parity violation are 
profitable for arbitrage when tmnsootloo oosts are aooounted for. In addition, the t-test 
results also support the put-cal parity boundary equations. That Is, there Is a 
significant dlffereooe in the mesn of the left hand side expression from the mesn of 
the right hand side expreseioo for both boundary equations. Thus the evldeooe of the. 
analysis support hypothesis 1 and attest to the efficiency of the AOIIII. 
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loodoo (1988) In his analysis argued that restrk:IIOII on short sale of stock and 
dMdel'ld uooertalnty Impled that upper boondary oondltiOII should be more restrictive 
11M tha lower boondary oondltiOII. Gillen that tha short selling of stock Is permitted In 
tha period covered In this study and that tha sample ~lly exclude dividends, 
tha upper and lower boondafY oondltiOII would be expooted ·to be equally restrictive. 
Thus It Is expooted that en illslgnll'k:ant diffel'elloo In upper and lower vlolatloo rates 
and VkllatiOI'I size would be observed. 
H:z.1 : There Is oo slgnifloom «Mereooe in tha fmqueooy of observed upper . 
boundary parity vlolatloos and lower boundary parity VIolations. 
H:z2 : There Is oo significant dlll'ereooe in tha observed upper boundary violation 
size and lower boundary parity vlolatloo size. 
The results do oot support tha hypothesis that there Is oo significant dlll'ereooe In 
upper and lower boundary vlolatloo rates and violation size. lower boundary 
VIolations were observed more often than upper boundary VIolations. The result In tha 
test supported loodoo (1988), Gray (1939) and Brown and Easton (1992) findings. 
However, tha upper violation size was greater than tha lower violation size which Is 
lnoonslstent With preVIous studies. Results of tha present study also reported a 
smaller violation size compared to findings of previous studies which coold oo 
possible Ieeming effect OOWI'I'ing In AOM. 
Given that put-ool parity does not distinguish amongst l'lmls or sectors, there should 
not be any ~nt difference In the number of boundary 111o1at1oos obselved 
across the foor l'lmls. 
H3 : There Is oo significant difference in the frequency of boundary violations 
among oompanles and sectors. 
No significant dll'fereooe In the frequency of upper boundary vlolstloos were foond 
among the foor l'lmls but the frequency of the~ loWer OOul'ldary VIolations . 
exhibit a significant dll'ferenoo among the l'lmls. The evldenoo for efl'oot of low trading 
volume to elqllaln the slgfllfloont difference Is miXed. It OOI'IOOtly predided that the 
most actively traded firm BHP woold hew the lowest v1o1st1oo mtes but the least 
traded l'lml, CRA, has the seoond lowest loWer violation rate which Is lnoonSistent. 
Thus "low trading volums" effeol appears not to be the caues of the significant 
relation fOI.II'Id betWeen Violations mtes and firms. 
Given that the mte used In the put-ool parity analysis Is not true risk free mte, the. 
efl'oot of using a dlfl'emnt mte should be more pronollfiCed es t1ms to msturlty 
lengthens. This efl'oot will only effeol the loWer boundary slnca dlsoountlng of the 
exerolse pl1oe Is only required In the lower boundary. 
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H4 : The frequency of lower bo!.mda;y vidatioos rate will be greater for options 
with longer terms to maturity. 
The result shows there Is a significant aSS!Xllatlon between the frequency of observed 
violations and tlma to maturity. Generally, the shorter time to maturity options tend to 
eXhibit a lower observed violation rate and violation size. Tlloogh surprisingly, the 
lowest violation rate and violation size was observed In the second longest time to 
maturity group. 
By noting thet "out of the money" options are relatively less 1reded then "in the 
money" options and thet the effect of low trading would cause more vidation to be 
undetected, the next hypothesis tested was: 
H5 : The fmqueooy of boonda;y violations will be greater for "In the money" 
options then "out of the money" options. 
The result for upper bounda!y violation reports thet there Is slightly more violations In 
"In the money" options than •out of the money" options. This Is li1oorlslstent with the 
hypothesis, though the aSS!Xllatlon between frequency of observed vldatlons and "In", 
"oot" of the money Is not significant. The evidence for lower oounda!y violation 
supports the hypothesis thet the less actively 1reded "out of the money" options wiN 
have more violations than "In the money" options. The relstlonship between frequency 
of observed violations and "In", "out" of the money was found to be significant. 
looking at lndlvld~al firm In isolation the result also supports the hypothesis that "out 
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of the I'OOI'Iey'' options should have mom violations than "In the money" options. 
Tlloogh It shoold be noted that only BHP options shoW a significant relation between 
frequency of obseived violations and "in", "out• of the money options. 
Conclusion 
Tile findings of the analysis leeds to the following ooncluslon: 
I) Tile Austmllan Options Market ~~~~as efflcient In tha period study. 
II) Tile dll'l'erenoe In violation mtes and violation sizes ~~~~are significantly 
dll'l'erent between upper and lower boundaries. Despite the removal of 
lnstlll.ltlooal restrldk:lna on short sale of stocks, lower boond<iil)' violation rete 
IIIIaS still greater than upper boondal)' violation rete. 
Ill) There appears to be a significant relation between firms and frequency of 
obseNed lower boondal)' violations. "low trading volume" effect fall to explain 
the significant dll'l'ereooe In violation retes among the firms, thoogillt did 
correctly predicted thet the most actively traded firms w!U have the lowest 
vlolatloo rete. 
iv) Tile effect of time to maturity, a proxy for lnstltlltlooal restriction oo r1s1t free. 
borrowing&, appear to have a significant effect oo put-CEIII parity relation. 
v) "In the money" optloos have less lower boondal)' violations than "out the 
money" optloo&. "low trading volume" effect appear to be the cauess for the 
differenCe In obseived violation mtes between the "In the money" options and 
"out the money" options. 
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Given that tha sample period In this study ooly oovered six months, a longer time 
period would aid in furtller understanding of the various effeds oo put-call perlty . 
relation. Furthsr research should also be oonducted to test why violations ooour more 
often In lower boondery than upper boundary. Also given that the deta use in this and 
othar study are oot true trai'ISI'Wtloo deta, there Is always tha pooslblllty of non 
syoohrooolus data observation. The current data limitations also exclude the ability to 
OOI'IdtKlt an ex ante test Thus further ex ante tests using better dats scuroe would 
also be Invaluable In testing the efficiency of the Australian Options Market. . 
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Appendix A (Transaction costs) 
following loudoo's(1988) oonstructloo of an <ll'bltmge trade for an ullderpriced 
put, the following ~ oosts are calculated. The following transaclloos are 
required: puts contracts are bought, calls oontmct written and number of shares 
are bought Initially which are later closed at the end of the I'Hbltmtlge and funds 
must be borrowed. Thus igool'lng coot of borrowing, the typlool transactloo coots 
for arbltmglng the maximum lower violation size found In this study are: 
~ 
Buy 100 puts II! $0.7 per share unit 
Sell100 puts II! $0.02 per share unit 
Buy 100,000 shares • $13.95 eaOO 
Sell100,000 shares. $14.95 eaOO 
Total 
Total Ccat-$62,687, per unit '"'$0.63 
Buy 100 puts 0 $0.035 per share unit 
Sell100 puts 0 $0.92 per share unit 
Buy 100,000 shares 0 $12.75 each 
Sell100,000 shares 0 $13.25 eadl 
Total 
Total Cost-$58,004, per unit -$0.58 
~ 
1,400 
40 
27,900 
28,900 
58240 
70 
1,840 
25,500 
26,500 
53,910 
stamp 
Duty3 
21 
lUI 
4,185 
4208.6 
Stamp Duty 
1.05 
21.6 
3,825 
3,853.65 
Exchange 
FHS4 
120 
120 
240 
120 
120 
240 
1 Prices are the actual observed stock, call and put prica for !he maximum lower violation 
size data. That is, BHP has the highest lower violation size of $0.08 and for !his viotallon 
the corresponding stock, call and put prices are $13.95, $0.02 and $0.7 respectively. It is 
than assumed !hat stock prica rise by $0.5 when the arbitrage portfolio are tarmineted. 
2 Brokerage is at 2% of contract value. Though it should be noted !hat brokaraga rates are 
negotiable and 2% are used as a indicativa rates. Also nota that option contracts value are 
par share unlt,lhus 100 puts will be equivalent to 1,000 share units. 
3 Stamp Duty is charged on a rate of 30 (3c) par $100 of oontract value for shares( options). 
4 Stock EXchange Fees are levied using the followi!!9 seals: 
No. of Option Contracts 
1-19 
20-49 
50-99 
>99 
1.5 
1.4 
1.3 
1.2 
Positions Brokerage ~DutY Exchange Fees 
Buy 100 puts ll $0.19 per share 380 5.7 120 
unit 
Sell100 puts ll $0.05 per share unit 100 1.5 120 
Buy 100,000 shareS. $4.51 each 9,020 1353 
Sell100,000 shareS. $5.01 each 10,020 
Total 19,520 1,300.2 240 
Total ~111201 1,!!! unit oo$0.21 
Positiol'ls Brokerage ~DutY Exchange Fees 
Buy 100 puts ll $0.04 per share 00 1.2 120 
unit 
Sell 100 puts ll $0.71 per share unit 1,420 21.3 120 
Buy 100,000 shareS Gl $5.30 each 10,000 1,590 
Sell100,000 shareS. $5.00 each 1'1,000 
Total 23,700 1,612.5 240 
T ota1 Costoo$2515531 I!! unit a$0.26 
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